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This research addresses the impact of political donations on wealth distributive
policies and demonstrates an alarming ideological divide along class lines within
the Republican Party. Professor Bruce Larson was a mentor throughout this
investigative process.
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ABSTRACT
Both Democrats and Republicans have taken strong positions on wealth
redistribution. But is there variance within the parties? I hypothesize that while
moderate non-donors and moderate donors will favor increases in federal
spending for such policies at similar rates, both liberal and conservative donors
will be less likely to favor spending due to attachment to their personal wealth.
This paper analyzes the differences in support for increasing the budgets of five
wealth redistributive policies while controlling for political donations: public
schools, welfare, aid to the poor, childcare, and Social Security. The research
finds that moderates and moderate donors support do not differ. Liberal nondonors are more likely to favor increases in spending for public school and Social
Security, while their donor counterparts favor childcare. Conservative donors are
consistently less likely than non-donors to favor increases in spending on wealth
redistributive policies. These findings expose a clear class split amongst
conservatives and indicates a concerning divide between the Republican political
elite and the constituents they are supposed to represent.
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As political parties have become increasingly polarized, so too have many
politicians’ stances on individual issues. The Republican Party has made it clear
that they are staunchly against large-scale wealth redistribution, while the
Democratic Party has made this idea part of the fabric of their party’s platform. Is
there a clear split only between the parties, or do divisions exist within them?
Donors tend to be wealthier than the average voter and therefore may have
different values when it comes to wealth redistributive policies. While it may be
obvious to assume that liberals will be in favor of wealth redistribution and
conservatives against it, is there a difference in the level of support for such
policies between donors and non-donors?
This distinction is important because it may reveal that elected officials
favor the views of their donating constituents over those of non-donating
constituents. In a political era dominated by campaign contributions, it is critical
to understand how money affects the policies politicians choose to pursue and
support. Additionally, wealthier donors may not understand the importance of
wealth redistributive policies such as aid to the poor, welfare, and Social Security
because they have never had to rely on it. On a more egalitarian note, it is
important that all voices are represented in politics in order to ensure that its
outcomes are representative of its people.
This research seeks to identify disparities within political ideologies as
they pertain to wealth redistributive policies. I hypothesize that while moderate
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non-donors and moderate donors will favor increases in federal spending for such
policies at similar rates, both liberal donors and conservative donors will be less
likely to favor spending than liberal non-donors and conservative non-donors due
to attachment to their personal wealth. This paper analyzes the differences in
support for increasing the budgets of five wealth redistributive policies while
controlling for political donations: public schools, welfare, aid to the poor,
childcare, and Social Security. The research finds that moderates’ and moderate
donors’ levels of support do not differ. Liberal non-donors are more likely to
favor increases in spending for public school and Social Security, while their
donor counterparts are more likely to favor an increase in spending for childcare.
Conservative donors are consistently less likely than non-donors to favor
increases in spending on wealth redistributive policies. These findings expose
slight differences between liberals non-donors and liberal donors, but more
significantly, a glaring class split amongst conservatives.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Wealth redistribution was one of the most salient topics of the 2016 presidential
election. From the left, Senator Bernie Sanders championed redistribution from
the top 1% to the rest of the country, whose income had largely stagnated. From
the right, Donald Trump campaigned on tax cuts that would redistribute wealth
back to middle-class voters. While the issue was addressed from both the
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Democratic and Republican parties, the two sides of the aisle spoke about the
issue with different targets for the redistributive efforts and different means by
which to achieve these goals. Schlozman, Verba and Brady argue that policy
outcomes are more responsive to high-income voters, who make up the majority
of political donors (2012). This literature review seeks to reconcile scholarly
research on wealth redistribution and party polarization to identify the effects, if
any, of donors on such policy outcomes leading up to the 2016 presidential
election.
Low-income voters are traditionally more likely to have a left-leaning
political ideology around the world. However, they are less likely to align
themselves with the left if non-economic party polarization is high. Even if it is
against their economic interests, low-income voters are often pulled towards the
right by moral polarization (Finseraas 2009, 296). Henning Finseraas notes that
“anti-redistributive rightist parties wishing to reduce the extent of redistribution”
may find distancing themselves from the left on social issues to be an efficient
strategy in gaining votes (2009, 298). Recently, there has been a global
conservative shift when it comes to wealth redistribution. Matthew Luttig
analyzes data presented by Lupu and Pontusson and finds that changes in the
structure of inequality results in more conservative ideological positions on
wealth redistribution (Luttig 2013, 817). However, this shift was not consistent
across all income quintiles. When the ratio between lower quintiles is increased,
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that quintile becomes more supportive of redistribution. When the ratio between
higher income quintiles is increased, the highest income quintile becomes three
times less supportive of redistribution than the lowest income is supportive of it
(Luttig 2013, 817). That being said, this study was conducted on 14 developed
countries; the United States was found to be the only outlier. This could be
because of the U.S.’s exceptionally high concentration of racial minorities in the
bottom income quintile (Lupu and Pontusson 2011, 329).
The U.S could be the outlier because its citizens generally have a positive
view of people at the low end of this inequality. Bartels finds that, overall,
Americans give “poor people” an average favorability rating of 73% over “rich
people”, who score an average of 60% (2008, 36). It should be noted that while
Americans have a positive view of poor people in general, this view is racially
charged and tied to an idea of “deserving” versus “undeserving” poor people
(Gilens 2009). Schneider and Ingram explain that these two categories of people
have been placed into two socially constructed groups. The “deserving” poor are
placed in a category that has a positive social construction, but weak political
power. The “undeserving” poor share weak political power due to a negative
social construction (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 335-337). This makes it difficult
for either group to have any effect on policy outcome, and furthermore makes
poor people rely on more powerful groups to craft the policy surrounding their
group.
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Ideals of political and economic equality have long differed in the
American psyche. Jennifer Hochschild finds that Americans believe in strict
equality in a political sense, but view “economic freedom as an equal chance to
become unequal” (Bartels 2008, 28). This results in conflict between firmly held
egalitarian beliefs and support for policies that exacerbate inequality (Bartels
2008, 29). Norton and Ariely find that while Americans prefer some degree of
inequality to perfect economic equality, most Americans vastly underestimate the
level of existing wealth inequality and construct far more equitable wealth
distributions in their ideal country (2011, 10). In their survey, Norton and Ariely
find that citizens who voted for Senator John Kerry in the 2004 election were
more likely than former President George W. Bush voters to report a higher
percentage of wealth held by the top 20%. Moreover, when Kerry voters were
asked to construct an ideal wealth distribution, they gave the top 20% of wealth
holders less than Bush voters did. Bush voters estimated that the top 20% holds
less wealth than they actually do, and in their ideal wealth distribution, would
hold more (2011, 11). These findings indicate that while egalitarian beliefs are
strong in most Americans, disagreements about the causes of inequality may
hinder chances for consensus (Norton and Ariely 2011, 12).
Regardless of the causes of inequality, the existing disparity significantly
favors the rich when it comes to political representation. Martin Gilens provides
evidence that policy outcomes of the United States government are more
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responsive to high-income voters “especially in policy domains where the
opinions of rich and poor diverge” (Bonica et al. 2012, 118). This is significant
when considering that Republicans are more sympathetic to tax burdens on the
rich while Democrats are more sympathetic to tax relief for the poor (Bartels
2008, 41). Such a split could lead to significant tax cuts for the rich when
Republicans are in power, followed by increases in the budget for social safety net
programs when Democrats are in power due to fundamental beliefs held by each
party.
The Republican Party values individualism above all else, while the
Democratic Party values both individualism and egalitarianism, creating potential
incongruity not present in the Republican Party’s message (Ura and Ellis 2012,
280). However, both parties have been found to become more liberal in response
to growing income inequality (Ura and Ellis 2012, 285). The reaction of the two
parties is not the same; Ura and Ellis find an asymmetric party polarization driven
predominantly by the preferences of the Republican Party (2012, 288). While the
authors note that they implicitly neglected the role of political elites in shaping
polarization, other authors attempt to fill the gaps in information (Ura and Ellis
2012, 289). Bonica et al. note that rich Americans have been able to influence
“electoral, legislative, and regulatory processes through campaign contributions,
lobbying, and revolving door employment of politicians and bureaucrats.” (2013,
105) The authors note that it is difficult to gauge the effect of monetary
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contributions to Democrats on their positions on wealth redistribution, largely
because the party’s donating base has recently shifted from the traditional small
number of large donors to a more grassroots system of fundraising (Bonica et al.
2013, 113).
Grossman and Hopkins argue that while the parties have clear differences
on policy issues regarding wealth redistribution, most individual Americans are
symbolic conservatives but operational liberals (2016). In the context of
favorability towards poor people, this could mean that Americans are
symbolically against spending to the poor, yet when presented with a specific
policy (such as an increase in public school spending), they indicate that they are
in favor of such a policy. While political ideology is a critical factor in
understanding the support of wealth redistribution, education levels also play a
role. When broken down by education levels, those with the lowest levels of
education were more sympathetic toward the tax burden on rich people and
unsympathetic toward the tax burden on poor people (Bartels 2008, 41). This
could be because people with low education levels are less aware of how large the
wealth disparity is.
Bonica et al. theorize that either party could implement policies to
ameliorate the recent sharp rise in inequality, but do not due to extreme
polarization between the parties, lack of voter participation, feedback from highincome campaign contributors and the nature of political institutions (2013, 121).
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This is underlined by an embrace of free market capitalism from both major
parties in the U.S., which results in lower support for social safety nets that rely
on wealth redistribution. The parties differ, however, in their general ideological
drifts. Republicans have become “sharply” more conservative while Democrats
have shifted only slightly left (Bonica et al. 2013, 106). Even with the shift to the
left in the Democratic Party, the party has shifted away from social welfare
policies and towards policies that “target ascriptive identities of race, ethnicity,
gender, and sexual orientation.” (Bonica et al. 2013, 107) These factors are not
mutually exclusive with wealth redistribution. In fact, racial minorities are often
the groups that would benefit most from social welfare policies as they make up
the largest percentages of the lowest income quintiles.
The Great Recession of 2008 provided ample political movement on the
issue of wealth inequality that was ultimately unrealized. As the inequality
increases, the real value of the minimum wage, taxes on income from capital, the
top marginal income tax rates, and estate taxes have all fallen (McCarty, Poole,
Rosenthal 2006, 118). Additionally, there has been little to no political support for
reforms of the financial sector, substantial reduction of mortgage foreclosures, or
expansion of investment in human capital of children from low-income
households (Bonica et al. 2013, 108). Luttig argues that as economic inequality
increases, support for wealth redistribution policies decreases as those who are in
a position to influence policy stand to lose as a result of welfare-enhancing
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policies (2013, 812). This would imply that as contributors to politics become
richer, their incentive to give to candidates who support wealth redistribution
declines, making lower-income voters’ voices muffled below the money.
As party leaders have moved towards extremes, parties as a whole have
cued voters to vote based on their income (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006,
92). Relative income is a statistically significant factor in Republican partisanship.
The Republican Party has increased the size of its base by moving away from
redistributive policies as income stratification of voters intensifies (McCarty,
Poole, and Rosenthal 2006, 82, 108). McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal write in
2006 that increases in net worth, wealth, home ownership, and securities
ownership could be explanatory factors in the diminished desire for social
insurance and the growth in size of the Republican Party (108). This growth was
accompanied by a decrease in the party’s favorability outlook on wealth
redistribution efforts. Despite the right’s distinguished position on social issues,
from the 1960s to the early 2000s, partisanship by income led to a “rich-poor
cleavage” between the parties (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006, 74). While
every policy issue could be considered from an economic perspective, recent
elections have focused more on social and moral aspects of myriad issues, such as
the social issue of increased immigration and the moral issue of legalizing gay
marriage. Hacker and Pierson highlight the decline of labor unions as a means of
shaping public opinion among working class voters. They also cite the
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Democratic Party’s shift from populist elements in order to appeal to affluent
social liberals, leaving the Republican Party a clear opportunity to recruit those
voters with promises of “individual gains” from low taxes and small government
(Nagel and Smith 2013, 162). This may cause low-income voters to vote against
economic policies that may benefit them, like wealth redistribution (McCarty,
Poole, and Rosenthal 2006, 96).
Democrats are more likely than Republicans to sponsor bills such as
student loan forgiveness or increases in the minimum wage that are aimed at
addressing economic inequality (Kraus and Callaghan 2014, 4-5). Non-white
members of both parties in Congress are more likely to sponsor legislation that
addresses economic inequality (Kraus and Callaghan 2014, 4). When
deconstructed, Kraus and Callaghan discover that while Republicans tend not to
sponsor legislation that addresses wealth redistribution regardless of their
personal wealth, Democrats are more likely to sponsor the same legislation if they
are personally of lower wealth (2014, 4). While there was no significant effect for
gender in Congress as a whole, Democratic women are more likely to sponsor
legislation addressing economic inequality than their male counterparts (Kraus
and Callaghan 2014, 4). However, as Congress has continued to be dominated by
wealthy white men, the legislative branch has “punched the gas pedal” to
accelerate inequality (Carnes 2016, 107).
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Despite efforts by the Democratic Party, low-income Americans have
steadily been shifting right in their political views. Katherine J. Cramer finds that
this is a result of the increase in national economic inequality. Part of this stems
from what Cramer labels “rural consciousness,” a mindset adopted by many rural
dwellers who feel ignored by politics and deprived of the resources they feel they
deserve (2016, 5). She also points out that the Republican Party was built upon
anti-New Deal, and therefore anti-wealth redistributive, policies. It is in the
interest of the party that “attention to class to be diverted to attention to race”
(Cramer 2016, 16). Most importantly, Cramer argues, is the composition of the
poor in the United States, who are predominantly racial minorities. This means
that middle-income voters lack a psychological connection to the poor and are
therefore less likely to support a redistribution of resources to them (Cramer 2016,
17).
Regardless of where low-income citizens lie on the political spectrum,
they historically do not turn out to vote in large numbers (Bonica et al. 2013,
110). Perhaps as a result of this, vote-seeking candidates are more responsive to
political activists than to the median voter (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012,
261). This is important because on average, political activists are wealthier and
less likely to support wealth redistribution policies than the average citizen. Many
of these political activists donate money to their party and candidates of that
party, although the income of these donors differs greatly between parties; there is
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a party split between Democrats and Republicans of $76,000 to $118,000,
respectively (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012, 256).
This gap has a compelling connection to Schlozman, Verba, and Brady’s
observations on perspectives of economic inequality and political polarization.
The authors note that “the ideological shift among Democrats derives from the
increasing liberalism of the most affluent Democrats” (2012, 259). It would then
seem to follow that party activists, who tend to be wealthier than the average
party member, would drive the ideological positions of party members as a whole
to the left. Bonica et al. note that contributions from party activists may have a
significant impact on legislation that would address economic inequality, such as
a higher tax rate on carried interest income received by private equity investors
(2013, 118). Because Republican policies are typically more sympathetic towards
tax burdens on the rich while Democratic policies are more sympathetic towards
poor people, their responses to economic inequality will differ significantly
(Bartels 2008, 41).
Partisans do not always follow the lead of party activists, however. In
2012, Republican voters supported tax increases on the wealthy while party
leaders publicly opposed such legislation (Hershey 2014, 252). However,
historically speaking, the official party position reflects the view of the majority
of partisans in the electorate. Party positions can go so far as to obfuscate
objective conditions, like inflation, that surround economic inequality (Hershey
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2014, 253-255). Logan Hershey finds that “on a range of issues, scholars find that
awareness of elite-level differences and the presence of elite debate on an issue
are the drivers of opinion change in the mass public.” He continues, saying that a
“major reshuffling of the political environment” could “disrupt the relatively
stable party attachments in the electorate.” (Hershey 2014, 256) It could be argued
that in the past few decades, a rise of extremes within each party indicates a future
such reshuffling. This is caused in part by competitive primaries, in which
incumbents must become more extreme in order to capture the maximum number
of votes.
This shift to extremes manifested in the 2016 presidential election. This
election cycle was revolutionary in the rhetoric utilized to mobilize voters. On the
Republican side, Donald Trump campaigned on bringing back American jobs
from abroad in order to address the sentiments of economic insecurity in the
middle class. The Democratic response to rising economic inequality was to
address equal pay across genders, the stagnant minimum wage, universal
healthcare, and campaign finance reform. Before the 2016 presidential election,
the Republican Party was characterized, and perhaps caricatured, for being
supported by predominantly rich, white men, but Donald Trump enfranchised
low-income voters with many of his stances on social issues. Former Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton, on the other hand, disenfranchised many low-income voters
with her connections to high-income institutions like Goldman Sachs. This
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upended the traditional alignment of low-income voters with the Democratic
Party. However, it is improbable that this shift was sudden or a one-time fluke.
Rather, it seems more likely that low-income voters have gradually been shifting
right, a trend that was overlooked by elites as they continued to favor the voices
of their wealthier constituents.
Neither the Republican nor the Democratic parties have made significant
efforts to craft policy aimed at a significant redistribution of wealth. Political
inaction could be due to extreme party polarization, contributions from wealthy
donors who do not support redistributive efforts, or a combination of the two in
which donors cause polarized gridlock on this issue (Finseraas 2009; Schlozman,
Verba and Brady 2012). Although factors of gender, race, and ethnicity on
ideological positions regarding wealth redistribution efforts is outside the scope of
this paper, it is important to note that white, wealthy men in Congress are the least
likely to support redistribution efforts (Kraus and Callaghan 2014). There appears
to be a gap in literature that directly addresses the influence that party elites exert
to steer conversation and policy outcomes on wealth redistribution. In light of the
historic 2016 presidential election, it is necessary to analyze who steers the
conversation on redistributive policies in order to assess whether or not the elite
stance is truly representative of the American people.

HYPOTHESIS AND THEORETICAL ARGUMENT
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This paper seeks to answer the question: is there a difference in levels of support
for wealth redistributive policies between donors and non-donors of similar
ideologies? Because donors tend to be wealthier than the average voter, it is
logical to assume that they may be more conservative in their beliefs on wealth
redistribution. This is because many wealthy donors believe that they stand to lose
some of their personal wealth by supporting such policies. Additionally, many
donors have never benefitted directly from programs that redistribute wealth and
therefore cannot attest to their ability to help. I posit that donors will generally be
less likely to favor wealth redistributive policies than non-donors. However, I
predict that the differences will vary within each ideological category. For this
reason, I propose three hypotheses regarding the three political ideology
categories utilized in this study.
Hypothesis 1: Liberal donors will be less likely to favor wealth
redistributive policies than liberal non-donors.
Because liberal donors are typically wealthier than their non-donor
counterparts, I predict that the donors will be less likely to favor wealth
redistributive policies. While donors will preach redistributive policies and
practices as a part of the larger party platform, they will de facto favor them at
lower rates than the rest of their party. While Schlozman, Verba, and Brady found
that Democratic elites are driving the party to the left, I predict that this shift will
manifest in issues other than wealth redistribution (2012, 259). These findings
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have the potential to expose a symbolic liberalism within elites in the Democratic
Party that breaks down to more moderate views when individual items in the
federal budget are considered.
Hypothesis 2: Moderate donors will be just as likely to favor
wealth redistributive policies as moderate non-donors.
As the American political party system becomes more polarized, so too do
donors. This leaves very few donors in the middle of the two parties. Moreover,
donors often give money to certain candidates and causes because they believe
strongly in one side or another. Donors also tend to give money in the hopes of
winning, which leads them to candidates from the two established parties that
stand a chance at winning national elections. I predict that because many
moderates do not have strong feelings regarding wealth redistributive policies,
they and the donors in their category will not have significantly different views.
Hypothesis 3: Conservative donors will be less likely to favor
wealth redistributive policies than non-donor conservatives.
Conservatives and the Republican Party have positioned themselves
staunchly against wealth redistributive policies. While most conservative donors
have never benefitted directly from these policies, many of their constituents
have. For this reason, I believe that conservative non-donors will be more likely
to favor wealth redistributive policies when they are framed as individual
programs (for example, Social Security, childcare, welfare) as opposed to a
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progressive tax shifting wealth because they are personally familiar with the
programs. Conservative donors, on the other hand, have the privilege to take a
strict ideological stance against these programs because they do not rely on any of
them. Strict conservatism is a “system-justifying ideology, in that it preserves the
status quo and provides intellectual and moral justification for maintaining
inequality in society.” (Jost et al. 2003, 63) I therefore predict that conservative
donors will be strong advocates for the status quo when it comes to wealth
redistribution policies.

DATA AND METHODS
The data in this paper comes from the 2012 American National Elections Study
(ANES) Time Series Study. The unit of analysis in this study is individuals and
the cases are respondents to the survey. 5,916 respondents were surveyed, so
N=5,916. The dependent variable for this survey was ideological placement, for
which survey respondents were sorted into the following categories: liberal,
moderate, and conservative. These categories came from the NES 7-point liberalconservative scale. While this does not measure Democrats, Independents, and
Republicans exactly, we can assume that most liberal donors will give to
Democrats and conservative donors to Republicans. Measuring ideological
positioning is a more helpful variable than party identification because it allows
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for an analysis of personal symbolic ideological placement that can then be
compared to operational ideology.
There are five distinct independent variables. Because the term “wealth
redistribution” is politically charged, a direct question regarding favorability
towards relevant policies would most likely illustrate a clear partisan split.
Instead, I decided to measure five policies that redistribute wealth in various,
concrete ways. These variables include government funding for public schools,
welfare, aid to the poor, childcare, and Social Security. In the survey, all
respondents were asked whether they thought the federal budget for this program
should be increased, decreased, or kept about the same. Each response received a
score of zero if the respondent answered “decreased” or “kept about the same.” A
score of one was applied to respondents that answered “increased.” This scoring
system is employed because keeping federal aid of these programs the same
decreases the real value of the budget with inflation, thereby decreasing the
funding over the long term. These five variables were then compiled into a
variable henceforth referred to as “social welfare.” Each response to the question
(should federal spending on [welfare variable] be decreased, kept the same, or
increased?) received a score of zero, one, or two, respectively. The social welfare
gives respondents a score from zero to ten based on the sum of their answers to
the five aforementioned variables, measuring their overall favorability towards
wealth redistributive policies.
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This study controlled for political donations. If an individual responded
yes to giving to individual political candidates, political parties, or both, they were
considered political donors. This allows for a deeper analysis that goes beyond
partisan differences in support for wealth redistributive policies. Controlling for
political donations also allows for a separation of the party elites’ ideology from
non-donating party members, who may have different stances on the same issues.
Identifying any differences will give credit to the argument that party elites
manipulate candidates they donate to while the average voter must adapt to the
changing party (Hershey 2014, 256).
The analysis will begin with an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of
social welfare in order to analyze the difference between parties and their donors
on a general level. From there, each individual contributing variable to the social
welfare category (Social Security, welfare, childcare, public school, and aid to the
poor) will be analyzed via logistic regressions. One general logistic regression
will be done for all six categories of survey respondents: liberal, liberal donor,
moderate, moderate donor, conservative, and conservative donor. From there, a
logistic regression will be performed to analyze the differences between the
donors and non-donors of each specified ideology.

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
General
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Table A (see Appendix) illustrates the frequency of liberals, liberal donors,
moderates, moderate donors, conservatives, and conservative donors. For each
ideological affiliation, there were significantly lower numbers of donors than
there were non-donors. Table 1 demonstrates the average social welfare score of
each of the six groups. Each survey respondent received a score of zero, one, or
two based on their support for a decrease, maintenance of the same, or increase,
respectively, in the federal budget for each separate category included in the
social welfare scale (public school, welfare, childcare, aid to the poor, and Social
Security). A mean score of zero indicates that the group wants to decrease the
federal budget in all measured aspects of social welfare and ten means the group
wants to increase the budget for all five categories.
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Table 1: Mean score of the six categories of
respondents on the social welfare scale.
Mean

N

Std. Dev.

Liberal

6.952584

1460 1.926986

Liberal Donors

7.118597

268

2.005978

Moderate

6.231209

932

2.088464

Moderate Donors

5.982533

77

2.041533

Conservative

5.117015

2209 2.434877

Conservative Donor

3.832257

277

Total

5.876123

5221 2.412499

2.537898

Based on Table 1, it is possible to see the polarization in the liberal and
conservative donor groups. Liberal donors receive the highest average score of
7.12 while their non-donor counterparts receive a 6.95. On the other side,
conservative donors receive the lowest mean score of 3.83, which is lower than
their non-donor counterparts’ score of 5.11. Moderate non-donors received a
mean score of 6.23, while moderate donors averaged a more conservative score of
5.98. When an OLS regression is performed, it is possible to see the significant
difference between these means (Table B). Liberals vary significantly from
moderates, conservatives, and conservative donors. However, they do not vary
significantly from their donor counterparts (Table C). Table D illustrates a lack
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of significant difference between moderates and moderate donors. Table E, on
the other hand, shows a significant difference between conservatives and
conservative donors, with conservative donors scoring lower on the social welfare
scale.
Public School
When broken down into individual categories, the differences between ideologies
and the donors that adhere to them becomes clearer. Respondents were asked if
they thought federal spending on public schools should be increased, decreased,
or kept about the same. If the response was “decreased” or “kept about the same,”
the answer was assigned a zero. If the response was “increased,” the answer was
assigned a one. Table F illustrates the odds ratio of each of the six categories of
respondents’ views to changes in federal spending on public schools. An odds
ratio conveys “by how much the odds of the outcome of interest occurring change
for each unit change in the independent variable” (Pollock and Edwards 2018,
168). Table 2 makes clear that liberals (with an odds ratio of 4.115, as seen in
Table F) are much more likely to support increasing the federal budget for public
schools than any other group.
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Table 2: Mean values of responses to an increase in
the federal budget for public schools.
Mean

N

Std. Dev.

Liberal

0.8045086

1480

0.3967125

Liberal donor

0.7431517

270

0.4377072

Moderate

0.6287281

942

0.4834016

Moderate donor

0.6947676

84

0.4632562

Conservative

0.5335028

2281

0.4989857

Conservative donor

0.2971352

286

0.4577970

Total

0.6258352

5344

0.4839518

Moderate donors (with a score of 1.344) are the only other group to favor an
increase. Liberal donors, moderates, conservatives, and conservative donors
favored either maintenance of the status quo or decrease in the federal budget.
Table G gives the results from a logistic regression that considers all six
categories of respondents with “liberal” serving as the intercept. It is clear from
the P-values (“Pr(>|t|)” on the table) that there is a significant difference between
liberals, moderates, and conservatives. Does this mean that donors do not hold
significantly different opinions on federal spending on public schools from
liberals? This seems improbable. It more likely means that being a donor does not
make an individual hold significantly different opinions than their non-donating
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counterparts. In order to ensure that this interpretation was correct, the data from
Table G was broken down into three separate logistic regressions (Table H, Table
I, Table J) to measure the significance in difference between liberals and liberal
donors, moderates and moderate donors, and conservative and conservative
donors, respectively. Liberals and liberal donors vary with a p-value of 0.1 (a
value just short of conventional levels of statistical significance), with liberal nondonors being less likely to favor an increase in the federal budget for public
schools (Table H). Table I illustrates a lack of significant difference between
moderates and moderate non-donors. In Table J, it is possible to see that
conservatives and conservative donors differ significantly in their opinions on
federal spending on public schools. Conservative donors are significantly more
likely to favor keeping the federal budget about the same or decreasing it than
their non-donor counterparts.
Welfare
Interestingly, all groups scored below 0.26 (on a scale of zero to one) when asked
about an increase in the federal budget for welfare (Table 3). This ranged from a
0.252 from liberal donors to a 0.056 from conservative donors, an illustration of
the argument that donors tend to be more extreme in their views than their nondonor counterparts. This implies a general lack of support for welfare spending or
dissatisfaction with the program as a whole. Table 3 shows a comparison of the
means across the six groups of respondents.
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Table 3: Mean values of responses to an increase in
the federal budget for welfare.
Mean

N

Std. Dev.

Liberal

0.21592363

1473

0.4116013

Liberal donor

0.25187830

270

0.4348984

Moderate

0.13303709

942

0.3397952

Moderate donor

0.09268711

83

0.2917518

Conservative

0.07599589

2267

0.2650500

Conservative donor

0.05636867

286

0.2310367

Total

0.13294683

5321

0.3395492

The odds ratio for responses to welfare spending illustrate that liberal
donors have the most positive response to an increase in spending, although their
score is still low (Table K). Similar to the response for federal spending on public
schools, Table L shows a highly significant difference between liberals,
moderates, and conservatives when it comes to welfare. Tables M, N, and O
illustrate that there is no significant difference between liberals and liberal donors,
moderates and moderate donors, and conservatives and conservative donors,
respectively. However, it is interesting to note that not a single category of donors
received a significantly different score than their non-donating counterparts. This
could be because of effectiveness in messaging from the parties that represent
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liberals and conservatives. More likely, it is indicative of an overall lack of
support for the program.
The results from the logistic regression on welfare seem to tie back into
the argument posed by Gilens that poor people can either be “deserving” or
“undeserving” (1999). The hoops that people must jump through to obtain welfare
benefits (for example, drug testing) seem to imply that they are not trusted to use
the system properly and therefore “undeserving” of such wealth redistribution
efforts. Alternatively, Schneider and Ingram would argue that welfare recipients
have been placed in a socially constructed group that is both viewed negatively
and given weak political power, leading those with power to not support the
program as a whole (1993).
Aid to the Poor
Similar to the results for welfare spending, liberal donors and conservative donors
represented the extremes on the mean scores scale in regard to the federal budget
for aid to the poor (Table 4).

30

Table 4: Mean values of responses to an increase in
the federal budget for aid to the poor.
Mean

N

Std. Dev.

Liberal

0.4953054

1480

0.5001469

Liberal donor

0.5307258

271

0.4999786

Moderate

0.4008793

943

0.4903366

Moderate donor

0.3815680

84

0.4886966

Conservative

0.2499604

2259

0.4330857

Conservative donor

0.1541460

287

0.3617192

Total

0.3561007

5325

0.4788905

The odds ratio for this data indicates that the odds of favoring an increase in
spending on the poor for liberal donors was 15% higher than that of a non-liberal
donor, while the odds of a conservative donor were 85% lower than a nonconservative donor (Table P). Table Q illustrates significant differences between
liberals, moderates, and conservatives. When broken down by ideology, logistic
regressions yielded no significant different between liberals and liberal donors,
nor between moderates and moderate donors (Table R, Table S). There was a
strong significant difference between conservatives and conservative donors (with
a P-value below 0.01), in which conservative donors were less likely to favor an
increase in the federal budget for aid to the poor (Table T).
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Childcare
When asked about federal spending on childcare, the groups again illustrated
significant differences in their values. Once again, liberal donors had the highest
means score while conservative donors had the lowest mean score (Table 5).

Table 5: Mean values of responses to an increase in
the federal budget for childcare.
Mean

N

Std. Dev.

Liberal

0.4628661

1481

0.4987876

Liberal donor

0.5404033

270

0.4992918

Moderate

0.3250649

944

0.4686474

Moderate donor

0.2300255

77

0.4236041

Conservative

0.2494619

2261

0.4327974

Conservative donor

0.1507043

286

0.3583885

Total

0.3314778

5317

0.4707887

The odds ratio for federal spending on child care reinforces this information,
illustrating that liberal donors are the only group that are more likely to favor an
increase in spending than not (Table U). Table V illustrates strong differences
between most of the groups. When broken down by ideology, it is shown that
liberal donors are more likely to favor an increase in federal spending on
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childcare than their non-donor counterparts, although the P-value falls just short
of conventional levels of statistical significance (Table W). As with the previous
variables, there was no difference between moderates and moderate donors on the
issue of child care (Table X). However, there was a highly significant difference
between conservatives and conservative donors, with conservative donors being
less likely to favor an increase in federal spending on child care (Table Y).
Social Security
Interestingly, liberal donors did not score the highest when it came to federal
spending on Social Security (Table 6). In fact, liberals were the only group to
have an odds ratio above a value of one, meaning that the odds of a liberal
respondent supporting an increase in the budget for Social Security were 16.8%
higher than a non-liberal (Table Z). Unlike welfare, Social Security is not a
means-tested program and as such, it not typically viewed as a program for the
poor. Unlike welfare, the beneficiaries of Social Security are not a part of a
negatively viewed social group. Therefore, the program as a whole receives
higher favorability ratings.
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Table 6: Mean values of responses to an increase in
the federal budget for Social Security.
Mean

N

Std. Dev.

Liberal

0.5387621

1474

0.4986645

Liberal donor

0.4629038

269

0.4995501

Moderate

0.5311211

943

0.4992955

Moderate donor

0.4232112

84

0.4970192

Conservative

0.4491807

2269

0.4975204

Conservative donor

0.2531787

284

0.4356008

Total

0.4783288

5322

0.4995771

While most groups responded close to the mean of 0.478, there was
significant variance among ideological categories (Table AA). For liberals, nondonors were slightly less likely to support an increase in the federal budget for
Social Security (Table AB). For moderate donors and non-donors, there was no
significant difference (Table AC). Conservatives had the largest and most
significant differences. Conservative non-donors hovered just slightly below the
mean of 0.478, but conservative donors were significantly less likely to favor an
increase in spending on Social Security at 0.253 (Table AD).
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DISCUSSION
When analyzed by variable (public school, welfare, aid to the poor, childcare, and
Social Security), it is simple to see that there are significant differences in
ideology between liberals, moderates, and conservatives. However, do the
differences persist when controlling for political donations? The answer for
moderates is a resounding no. There was not a single category in which moderates
held significantly different beliefs from their donating counterparts. It is important
to note that the number of “moderate donor” responses was always the lowest of
the six categories. This could be because donors tend to give money because of
strongly held beliefs that generally represent strong, polarized views (Schlozman,
Verba, and Brady 2012). This results in the donors picking a party that will
champion their strongly held beliefs, which generally leads them to the
Democratic or Republican Parties. These results strongly support Hypothesis 2,
which predicted that moderate donors would be just as likely to favor wealth
redistributive policies as moderate non-donors.
The differences between liberals and liberal donors are more pronounced.
There were no significant differences between liberals and liberal donors in
regard to support for an increase in federal spending on welfare or aid to the poor.
In two categories (public school and Social Security), liberal donors were less
likely (with a P-value of 0.1, which falls short of conventional standards of
significance) to favor an increase in federal spending when compared to their non-
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donor counterparts. This could be because there are fewer donors than non-donors
who directly benefit from these services. Wealthy donors may have gone to or
have children in private schools. Additionally, they may not need to rely on Social
Security. However, donors were more likely to favor an increase in federal
spending on childcare (again at the 0.1 level). This could be because wealthier
donors with children would directly benefit from such a service. These findings
do not support Hypothesis 1, which predicted that liberal donors would be less
likely to favor wealth redistributive policies than liberal non-donors. While this
was true for public school and Social Security, it did not hold true across all five
categories.
Conservatives, however, had statistically significant differences in levels
of support for social welfare spending than their donating counterparts. There was
only one category in which conservatives and conservative donors did not have
significantly different values: welfare spending. In the categories of federal
spending on public school, aid to the poor, childcare, and Social Security,
conservative donors were consistently less likely to favor an increase in spending.
This strongly supports Hypothesis 3, which posited that conservative donors
would be less likely to favor wealth redistributive policies than non-donor
conservatives. The implications of these findings are important in understanding
how the Republican Party has shifted dramatically right over the past few decades
while the Democratic Party has only gradually shifted left (Grossman and
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Hopkins 2016). These findings indicate that conservative donors are controlling
the direction of the party while non-donors’ more moderate views are being
drowned out by party elites. This should be important to political scientists in
understanding ideological trends on wealth redistributive policies and to elected
officials who may not be representing their average constituents’ views on wealth
redistributive policies.

CONCLUSION
This research asked if there was a significant difference between donors and nondonors when it came to support for wealth redistributive policies. By scoring
responses to the 2012 ANES Time Series Study for support of increased funding
for public schools, welfare, aid to the poor, childcare, and Social Security, it was
possible to run logistic regressions to determine whether such a significant
difference exists. Because donors tend to be high-income voters, I posited that
liberal donors and conservative donors would be less likely to support wealth
redistributive policies than their non-donating counterparts due to an attachment
to their personal wealth. That being said, because there are few causes that court
moderate donors, I hypothesized that moderate donors and non-donors would not
differ significantly in their views. I found that moderates and just as likely to
favor wealth redistributive policies as moderate non-donors. Liberal donors are
more likely to favor an increase in spending for childcare than liberal non-donors,
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who are more likely to favor an increase in public school and Social Security
spending. In every category but welfare spending, conservative donors were less
likely to favor an increase in spending on wealth redistributive policies.
These findings support McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal’s observation that
the Republican Party has increased its base by moving away from redistributive
policies (2006, 82, 108). This could be because, as Cramer argues, the
composition of the poor in the United States results in a lack of connection
between them and middle- and high-income voters (2016, 17). If middle- and
high-income voters are the majority of party activists, and vote-seeking
candidates are more responsive to party activists than the median voter, how do
activists shape the policy outcomes regarding wealth redistribution (Schlozman,
Verba, and Brady 2012, 261)? This paper adds to existing literature by offering
evidence that Republican elites want to shape these policies to be far more
conservative than even conservative non-donors. Because Republicans are
currently in control of the executive and legislative branches, they could use their
power to make dramatic slashes to social safety net programs. Just as important is
the contribution of further evidence of the class divide within the Republican
Party that Democrats could exploit or—without external intervention—could
cause a split between conservatives.
Future research should consider utilizing additional dependent variables to
federal budget spending on public schools, welfare, aid to the poor, childcare, and
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Social Security. Alternatively, a further analysis of the amount of money donated
(as opposed to a binary “yes” or “no”) and the scaled effects on candidates’
positions on wealth redistribution could prove to be illuminating. Holding these
findings to data from the 2016 presidential election could establish a trend in
wealth redistribution policies as the issues become increasingly salient. The sheer
amount of money in politics implies that political elites are out of touch with their
poor constituents that would benefit the most from these policies. More
importantly, the country as a whole would benefit if concrete steps were made to
lift America’s lowest classes.
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APPENDIX
Table A: Frequency of the six categories of respondents.
Frequency
Percent
Valid Percent
1525
25.778
28.362
Liberal
321
5.426
5.970
Liberal Donor
963
16.278
17.910
Moderate
113
1.910
2.102
Moderate donor
2143
36.224
39.855
Conservative
312
5.274
5.802
Conservative donor
539
9.111
NA’s
5916
100.000
100.000
Total

Social Welfare Tables
Table B: OLS regression results for social welfare by category of respondent.
Estimate
Std. Error T value
Pr(>|t|)
6.95258
0.06740
103.157
< 2e-16 ***
Intercept (liberal)
0.16601
0.18056
0.919
0.358
Liberal donor
-0.72137
0.11229
-6.424
1.44e-10 ***
Moderate
-0.24868
0.26684
-0.932
0.351
Moderate donor
-1.83557
0.09663
-18.996
< 2e-16 ***
Conservative
-1.28476
0.19820
-6.482
9.88e-11 ***
Conservative donor
Significance codes: 0.001 ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 ‘.’

Table C: OLS regression results for social welfare between liberal non-donors
and liberal donors.
Estimate
Std. Error
T value
Pr(>|t|)
6.95258
0.06740
103.157
< 2e-16 ***
Liberal
0.16601
0.18056
0.919
0.358
Liberal donor

Table D: OLS regression results for social welfare between moderate non-donors
and moderate donors.
Estimate
Std. Error
T value
Pr(>|t|)
6.23121
0.08981
69.384
< 2e-16 ***
Moderate
-0.24868
0.26684
-0.932
0.351
Moderate donor
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Table E: OLS regression results for social welfare between conservative nondonors and conservative donors.
Estimate
Std. Error T value
Pr(>|t|)
5.11701
0.06924
73.901
< 2e-16 ***
Conservative
-1.28476
0.19820
-6.482
9.88e-11 ***
Conservative donor

Public School Tables
Table F: Odds ratio results of responses to an increase in federal spending on
public schools.
Odds Ratio
2.5%
97.5%
4.115
3.469
4.882
Intercept (liberal)
0.703
0.475
1.040
Liberal donor
0.411
0.322
0.526
Moderate
1.344
0.736
2.454
Moderate donor
0.278
0.227
0.341
Conservative
0.370
0.265
0.516
Conservative donor

Table G: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal
spending on public schools.
Estimate
Std. Error
T value
Pr(>|t|)
1.4147
0.0872
16.223
< 2e-16 ***
Intercept (liberal)
-0.3523
0.1996
-1.765
0.0776 .
Liberal donor
-0.8880
0.1256
-7.071
1.74e-12 ***
Moderate
0.2957
0.3072
0.963
0.3357
Moderate donor
-1.2805
0.1043
-12.277
< 2e-16 ***
Conservative
-0.9952
0.1702
-5.847
5.31e-09 ***
Conservative donor
Significance codes: 0.001 ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 ‘.’

Table H: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal
spending on public schools between liberal non-donors and liberal donors.
Estimate
Std. Error
T value
Pr(>|t|)
1.4147
0.0872
16.223
< 2e-16 ***
Liberal
-0.3523
0.1996
-1.765
0.0776 .
Liberal Donors
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Table I: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal
spending on public schools between moderate non-donors and moderate donors.
Estimate
Std. Error
T value Pr(>|t|)
0.52676
0.09037
5.829
5.90e-09 ***
Moderates
0.29574
0.30717
0.963
0.335699
Moderate Donors

Table J: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal
spending on public schools between conservative non-donors and conservative
donors.
Estimate
Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|)
0.13421
0.05722
2.346
0.019030*
Conservatives
-0.99519
0.17021
-5.847
5.31e-09***
Conservative Donors

Welfare Tables
Table K: Odds ratio results of responses to an increase in federal spending on
welfare.
Odds Ratio
2.5%
97.5%
0.275
0.234
0.324
Intercept (liberal)
1.223
0.829
1.804
Liberal donor
0.557
0.411
0.755
Moderate
0.666
0.277
1.600
Moderate donor
0.299
0.230
0.389
Conservative
0.726
0.361
1.462
Conservative donor

Table L: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal
spending on welfare.
Estimate
Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|)
-1.28958
0.08277
-15.580
< 2e-16 ***
Intercept (liberal)
0.20096
0.19843
1.013
0.311211
Liberal Donor
-0.58479
0.15497
-3.773
0.000163 ***
Moderate
-0.40689
0.44731
-0.910
0.363058
Moderate Donor
-1.20846
0.13425
-9.002
< 2e-16 ***
Conservative
-0.31978
0.35679
-0.896
0.370144
Conservative Donor
Significance codes: 0.001 ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 ‘.’
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Table M: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal
spending on welfare between liberal non-donors and liberal donors.
Estimate
Std. Error
T value
Pr(>|t|)
-1.28958
0.08277
-15.580
< 2e-16 ***
Liberal
0.20096
0.19843
1.013
0.311211
Liberal Donors

Table N: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal
spending on welfare between moderate non-donors and moderate donors.
Estimate
Std. Error
T value
Pr(>|t|)
-1.8744
0.1310
-14.306
< 2e-16 ***
Moderates
-0.4069
0.4473
-0.910
0.363058
Moderate Donors

Table O: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal
spending on welfare between conservative non-donors and conservative donors.
Estimate
Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|)
-2.4980
0.1057
-23.635
< 2e-16 ***
Conservatives
-0.3198
0.3568
-0.896
0.370144
Conservatives Donors

Aid to the Poor Tables
Table P: Odds ratio results of responses to an increase in federal spending on aid
to the poor.
Odds Ratio
2.5%
97.5%
0.981
0.855
1.127
Intercept (liberal)
1.152
0.828
1.603
Liberal donor
0.682
0.545
0.853
Moderate
0.922
0.516
1.648
Moderate donor
0.340
0.281
0.410
Conservative
0.547
0.367
0.816
Conservative donor
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Table Q: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal
spending on aid to the poor.
Estimate
Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|)
-0.01878
0.07045
-0.267
0.789830
Intercept (liberal)
0.14184
0.16841
0.842
0.399692
Liberal donor
-0.38302
0.11448
-3.346
0.000826 ***
Moderate
-0.08110
0.29641
-0.274
0.784408
Moderate donor
-1.08004
0.09641
-11.203
< 2e-16 ***
Conservative
-0.60362
0.20400
-2.959
0.003101 **
Conservative donor
Significance codes: 0.001 ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 ‘.’

Table R: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal
spending on aid to the poor between liberal non-donors and liberal donors.
Estimate
Std. Error
T value
Pr(>|t|)
-0.01878
0.07045
-0.267
0.789830
Liberal
0.14184
0.16841
0.842
0.399692
Liberal donor

Table S: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal
spending on aid to the poor between moderate non-donors and moderate donors.
Estimate
Std. Error
T value Pr(>|t|)
-0.40180
0.09023
-4.453
8.63e-06 ***
Moderates
-0.08110
0.29641
-0.274
0.784408
Moderate Donors

Table T: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal
spending on aid to the poor between conservative non-donors and conservative
donors.
Estimate
Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|)
-1.09882
0.06581
-16.696
< 2e-16 ***
Conservatives
-0.60362
0.20400
-2.959
0.0031 **
Conservatives Donors
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Childcare Tables
Table U: Odds ratio results of responses to an increase in federal spending on
childcare.
Odds Ratio
2.5%
97.5%
0.862
0.751
0.989
Intercept (liberal)
1.364
0.981
1.899
Liberal donor
0.559
0.445
0.702
Moderate
0.620
0.345
1.115
Moderate donor
0.386
0.319
0.466
Conservative
0.534
0.353
0.806
Conservative donor

Table V: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal
spending on childcare.
Estimate
Std. Error T value
Pr(>|t|)
-0.14881
0.07045
-2.112
0.03472 *
Intercept (liberal)
0.31078
0.16861
1.843
0.06535 .
Liberal donor
-0.58178
0.11636
-5.000
5.92e-07 ***
Moderate
-0.47758
0.29920
-1.596
0.11050
Moderate donor
-0.95267
0.09640
-9.882
< 2e-16 ***
Conservative
-0.62760
0.21035
-2.984
0.00286 **
Conservative donor
Significance codes: 0.001 ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 ‘.’

Table W: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal
spending on childcare between liberal non-donors and liberal donors.
Estimate
Std. Error
T value Pr(>|t|)
-0.14881
0.07045
-2.112
0.03472 *
Liberal
0.31078
0.16861
1.843
0.06535 .
Liberal Donors

Table X: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal
spending on childcare between moderate non-donors and moderate donors.
Estimate
Std. Error
T value Pr(>|t|)
-0.7306
0.0926
-7.889
3.66e-15 ***
Moderates
-0.4776
0.2992
-1.596
0.11050
Moderate Donors
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Table Y: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal
spending on childcare between conservative non-donors and conservative donors.
Estimate
Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|)
-1.1015
0.0658
-16.740
< 2e-16 ***
Conservatives
-0.6276
0.2104
-2.984
0.00286 **
Conservatives Donors

Social Security Tables
Table Z: Odds ratio results of responses to an increase in federal spending on
Social Security.
Odds Ratio
2.5%
97.5%
1.168
1.016
1.343
Intercept (liberal)
0.738
0.529
1.029
Liberal donor
0.970
0.778
1.209
Moderate
0.648
0.374
1.122
Moderate donor
0.698
0.583
0.835
Conservative
0.416
0.295
0.585
Conservative donor

Table AA: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal
spending on Social Security.
Estimate
Std. Error T value
Pr(>|t|)
0.15536
0.07116
2.183
0.0291 *
Intercept (liberal)
-0.30402
0.16952
-1.793
0.0730 .
Liberal donor
-0.03071
0.11236
-0.273
0.7846
Moderate
-0.43425
0.28049
-1.548
0.1216
Moderate donor
-0.35934
0.09157
-3.924
8.82e-05 ***
Conservative
-0.87775
0.17416
-5.040
4.81e-07 ***
Conservative donor
Significance codes: 0.001 ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 ‘.’

Table AB: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal
spending on Social Security between liberal non-donors and liberal donors.
Estimate
Std. Error
T value
Pr(>|t|)
0.15536
0.07116
2.183
0.0291 *
Liberal
-0.30402
.16952
-1.793
0.0730 .
Liberal Donors
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Table AC: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal
spending on Social Security between moderate non-donors and moderate donors.
Estimate
Std. Error
T value Pr(>|t|)
0.12465
0.08696
1.433
0.15181
Moderates
-0.43425
0.28049
-1.548
0.12164
Moderate Donors

Table AD: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal
spending on Social Security between conservative non-donors and conservative
donors.
Estimate
Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|)
-0.20398
0.05764
-3.539
0.000405 ***
Conservatives
-0.87775
0.17416
-5.040
4.81e-07 ***
Conservatives Donors
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